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TAXATION OF RETIREMENT PROVISION
RICHARD L. STmcK*
The cessation of remunerative employment inevitably results in a reduction
of income if not its entire elimination. Among our 16.6 million persons over age
65,1 three-fifths have annual money income not exceeding $1,ooo. While the aver-
age income of this group is no doubt increasing, it is not clear whether the increase
will do more than offset the declining purchasing power of the dollar. Our present
federal tax laws extend a number of benefits to persons over age 65 in recognition
of the special problems which aging presents.
I
PRESENT TAX BENEFITS To THE AGING
A. Doubled Personal Exemptions
For the year in which a taxpayer attains age 65 and thereafter, he is entitled to an
additional income tax exemption of $6oo, and can thus receive $1,2oo without any
tax liability whatever 3 Indeed, one so situated need not even file a Federal In-
come Tax Return If both husband and wife have reached 65, the couple may re-
ceive $2,400 free of tax. The effect of this provision alone appears to eliminate
perhaps as much as four-fifths5 of our aged population from contributing to the
federal fisc via the income tax. If persons of this income level over age 65 should be
removed from the taxable category by reason of inability to pay, does not the same
inability indicate that all persons with income not exceeding $1,200 should be out-
side the income tax sphere? A proposal to increase personal exemptions of all tax-
payers to $i,2oo would certainly encounter opposition since it would entail a large
revenue loss. But the suggestion reveals the degree to which the present provision
favors one class of taxpayers over another similarily situated.
B. Liberalized Medical Expense Deduction
Generally, only extraordinary medical expenses-the amount in excess of three
per cent of adjusted gross income-can be deducted. Since 1958, persons over age
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65 have been entitled to deduct all medical and dental expenses, those falling below
as well as above three per cent of adjusted gross income.6 This treatment is in recog-
nition of the increasing medical expenses to which older persons are subject. How-
ever, to the extent that aged persons typically experience higher medical costs, they
are likely to be able fo meet the three per cent requirement. Given the same income,
should a person over 65 be entitled to deduct routine medical expense under three
per cent of adjusted gross income, while his younger fellow citizen cannot?
It has been urged that the critical problem involves persons who either cannot
afford to pay for medical service at the going rate or whose income is so small that
they would pay little if any tax even without the benefit of the medical expense de-
duction It is desirable to recognize the burden of increasing medical expense of
aging persons. The present trend towards health insurance might be encouraged
by relieving the three per cent requirement for taxpayers of all ages as to amounts
paid for health insurance premiums. The important deficiency in private insurance
plans seems to be the inadequate spreading of the risk of high medical expense which
comes in advanced years over the earlier working years. Such a deduction could
be limited to premiums paid on health insurance which was non-cancellable by
reason of age. It would be an important policy decision to favor insurance funding
of this liability as against current cash payment by the individual of the actual ex-
perienced expense. The impact which unusually large medical and hospitalization
expense can have upon the economic well-being of persons of limited income
indicates the social desirability of insurance funding. The maintenance of a
vigorous and independent medical profession might be enhanced by a broadened
program of private voluntary insurance. The same end could be encouraged by
limiting the employer's deduction to amounts paid as premiums on non-cancellable
policies-lifetime health insurance.
C. Social Security and Retirement Income Credit
The employer's contribution to the cost of Old Age and Survivors Disability In-
surance under the Social Security law (which in 1962 will amount to 3Y per cent
of wages and salaries) 8 is not included in the employee's income for tax purposes.
The corresponding employee's contribution is not deductible by him and hence is
paid out of taxable incomeY The benefits are entirely free of income tax when re-
ceived" ° even though only the employee's contribution thereto has previously been
subject to taxation. The portion of the benefits which arises from the employer's
contribution, the portion which arises from the interest earned on the Social Security
trust fund, and the portion (if any) which might arise from the general revenues
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2, at 258, 26o.
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of the Treasury Department are never subject to tax. Undoubtedly, a major rea-
son for this was the fact that the benefits are relatively small (although increasing
in recent years). What is sometimes overlooked is the fact that a person over age
65 receiving Social Security under present law also is entitled to an exemption of
$1,200.11 Thus under the present law a married couple could receive maximum Social
Security benefits of $1,524.12 and additional outside income from investments of $2,400
without becoming subject to the Federal Income Tax. Because of the ten per
cent optional standard deduction,"3 more than $2oo additional could be received
and yet no tax liability would arise. Is it necessary or desirable to excuse from Fed-
eral Income Tax liability married couples whose total income exceeds $4,000?
One who is under the Social Security law by virtue of the self-employment tax
will also receive all benefits tax free. The benefits will be the same despite the fact
that the total contribution on behalf of the self-employed person is considerably
less than the combined contribution of the employer and employee. 4 One reason
for this might be the fact that self-employment income may include some return on
capital investment in a proprietorship or partnership business as well as earnings
from personal effort. Tax equity, however, has not been achieved. The entire
contribution made by the self-employed contributor comes out of taxable income15
whereas only one-half of the contribution made for employees is included in the tax
base.
The inequity between persons receiving tax free Social Security benefits and
those who have provided for their retirement through private pension plans or volun-
tary individual savings is apparent. In the major tax revision of 1954, Congress at-
tempted to achieve tax parity by giving to the latter class of taxpayers the tax bene-
fit theretofore received by the former. The Retirement Income Credit'" relieves
from taxation, to the extent of the twenty per cent first bracket rate, amounts of
investment income received by retired persons up to $i,2oo (what was then the max-
imum Social Security retirement benefit). Any Social Security received by the re-
tired person would offset "retirement income" and thus would reduce or eliminate the
credit. By analogy to Social Security, earned income in excess of $1,2oo offsets
the "retirement income," so that $2,400 of earned income would eliminate the credit
entirely.
On September 27, 1961, H.R. 6371 was approved by the House of Representatives.
The imminent adjournment of Congress prevented this measure from becoming
"Note that under present Social Security law retirement payments (although lower) may begin at
age 62. 64 Stat. 492 (195O), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 416(a) (1958).
64 Stat. 492 (ig5o), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 415(a), col. IV (1958).
"CODE §§ 141, 3, 63 (b).
"The self-employment tax is approximately one and one-half times the employee's social security tax,
and thus three-fourths the amount of combined employer-employee tax. CODE § 1401 imposes the
self-employment tax at 4.7% for 1962. For the same year, the employee and employer each pay 3Y11%
or a total of 64%. CODE § 3111.
"The self-employment tax is a kind of federal income tax and hence non-deductible by CODE
§ x64(b)(x).
"CODE § 37.
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law, although its chances of passage in x962 would appear good. Its primary purpose
would be to raise the retirement income ceiling to $1,524, the present maximum
Social Security benefit. It would also modify the earned income rule so that the
earned income from $S,20o-$r,700, the first $500 over the permitted amount, would
offset retirement income only to the extent of one-half of the amount of income
earned. Space limitations preclude a detailed discussion of the almost unbelievable
intricacies of section 37 of the Code which deals with the Retirement Income Credit.
Suffice it to say that its already abundant complexities would be further enhanced
by the proposed changes.
Complicating the tax law enormously, section 37 is understood by only a few
retired persons subject to it. Probably many fail to receive its benefits because they
file a simple return form which operates to waive the benefit.1 Some who even file
Form 104o are totally mystified by the schedule that is devoted to computation of
this credit. And yet, even if fully utilized, the provision does not achieve its egali-
tarian purpose. The total exemption of Social Security benefits may benefit a high-
bracket recipient to an extent much larger than twenty per cent, while the credit
device used limits the benefits to those which would be achieved by a low bracket
taxpayer. The remedy is not to exclude retirement income altogether. The answer
may be to tax the proceeds of Social Security, allowing a corresponding deduction
to the employee or self-employed for his contribution to the cost.
D. Deferred Compensation
"Deferred compensation" in a general sense may describe any arrangement
whereby the realization of compensation for personal service is postponed to a
taxable year different from that during which the service was rendered. Greater tax
favor is accorded to "Qualified" plans, characterized by broad diffusion of the
benefits of the plan among the employees of a particular business enterprise.
(i) Advantages of the Qualified Plan
(a) Employee Deferral. The employer's contributions to the plan are not cur-
rendy taxable to the employee."8 Benefits, when received by the employee, are
taxable except to the extent that each payment represents a return of the employee's
previously taxed contributions to the plan. The aggregate of employee contri-
butions constitutes his "investment in the contract" for the purposes of the annuity
rule. If the employee's contributions are relatively minor so that their amount would
be recovered within the first three years of retirement, benefits are excluded en-
tirely from the employee's income until his contributions have been recovered
tax-free, whereupon all subsequent payments are fully taxable. Where the em-
ployee's contributions are relatively larger, the ratio between the investment in
the contract and the "expected return" is mathematically calculated. (The ex-
pected return is computed by multiplying the annual annuity payment by the
171d. H§ 37(i), 6o'4(a).
'Ild. H§ 40o2(a)( ), 403 (a) (i).
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life expectancy of the annuitant at the retirement date.) Thus, the proportion of
each payment which represents the return of the employee's capital investment is
excluded from income, and only the remaining portion of each payment consti-
tutes gross income for tax purposes. This proportionate exclusion is available to
the annuitant for so long as he may live, even though he may outlive his life ex-
pectancy and thus exclude more from income than the amount of his actual in-
vestment.'9
Deferral offers many subsidiary tax advantages: (x) The decline in income which
accompanies retirement places retirement income in lower tax brackets. (2) Per-
sonal exemptions are doubled, and $1200-$2400 per year will be in the zero tax
bracket. (3) Not only is the investment portion of retirement annuities exempt,
but even the "taxable" portion of retirement income from investment sources up
to $1200 per year, via the retirement income credit, is exempt from tax up to the
twenty per cent first bracket rate. (4) In recognition of the inequitably high brackets
which would apply if the employer's contribution to a qualified plan were paid to
the employee in a lump sum rather than an annuity, capital gain treatment was
extended to such payments in 1954.20 For persons whose income even in retirement
is relatively high, election of lump sum distribution may prove highly beneficial.
(5) Postponement of tax payment gives the employee the benefit of the use of the
"tax" funds in the interim, thus enhancing the retirement provision by the incre-
ment on the funds which would otherwise have been paid to the Government in
prior years.
(b) Employer Deduction. The employer's contributions to the plan are de-
ductible when made,2' even though this might appear inconsistent with deferral
of the employee's taxation. We encounter here a true "taxpayer's friend"--both the
employee and the employer receive the most favorable tax timing without en-
dangering the status of the other.
(c) Accumulation on Fund. The increment on funds set aside for retirement
accumulates tax-free.22 Instances are rare in which funds may become compounded
without the interposition of income tax reducing the net increment. The accumula-
tion on the fund, if applied to enhance retirement benefits, will reach the employee's
tax return eventually, subject to enhanced taxation. More realistically, the tax free
accrual is applied to reduce the employer's cost, rendering a plan more feasible. Of
course, the employee will receive more benefits than a given employer contribution
would yield absent this factor. Until 1959, tax-free accumulation was an advantage
uniquely available to trusteed plans. Since the funds provided for insured plans
were committed to the insurance companies, the earnings which they produced
were taxable in the same manner as any other insurance company income from a
like source. In 1959, the tax law was amended so as to exempt insurance com-
Sid. § 72.
SId. §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)(2), 1201, 1202. Employment must terminate.
5
'Id. § 404.
"Id. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(17).
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panies from income tax with respect to earnings produced by funds set aside for
qualified plans. 3  Thus, insurance companies are able to provide higher total
benefits for the same cost, or the former total benefits for a lower cost than formerly,
and are placed in an approximately equal competitive position with banks and trust
companies for the lucrative pension plan business.
(d) Estate Tax. The portion of annuity death benefits attributable to the em-
ployer's contributions is excluded from the employee's gross estate.2 4  If an em-
ployee had a vested contractual right to designate the recipient of death benefits
such amounts were considered property owned by the decedent and hence were tax-
able under the 1939 Code. 5  Otherwise, death benefits paid under totally non-
contributory plans escaped estate taxation because there was no "transfer" by the
decedent.26 The I954 Code eliminates the requirement of a transfer and includes
all benefits, whether purchased by decedent's contributions or by those of his em-
ployer, reserving favorable treatment for that portion of the benefits which is at-
tributable to the employer's contribution to a qualified plan.
(e) Gift Tax. Designation of a beneficiary to receive death benefits under a
qualified plan is excluded from the gift tax to the extent of benefits attributable to
the employer's contributions 7  This special exclusion, introduced in x958, does not
imply that all other similar transactions were before, or are now, subject to gift tax.
Only an irrevocable designation could result in gift tax liability in any event.28
Furthermore, the requirement of a "transfer" might preclude imposition of gift
tax even as to a non-qualified plan to which the employee made no contributions.2
(2) Requirements for Qualification
When the Revenue Act of 1942 clarified the treatment of pension plans by as-
suring the income tax advantages mentioned above, availability of these advantages
was restricted to those plans which diffused the benefit of retirement provision
among the employees of a particular business enterprise. It was decided that these
tax advantages should not be conferred on plans the benefits of which were avail-
' See generally Mayerson, New Tax Law Brings Many Changes to Life Insurance Companies, 13 J.
TAxATiON 71, 73 (xg6o).
'CODE § 2039(c).
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CODE § 2033.
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Supp. 56 (E.D. N.Y. 1937), aff'd on other issues, 99 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1938), 3o6 U. S. 363 (x939);
Estate of Salt v. Comm'r, 17 T.C. 92 (95); contra, G.C.M. 27,242, 1952-1 CUM. BULL. 16o; since
no transfer, nothing includible under other sections prior to enactment of § 2039 in 1954: Estate of
Miller v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 657 (1950); Estate of Haggett v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 325 (i95o); Libbey v.
United States, 147 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Calif. x956). Contra, Adeline S. Davis v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 378
(1956). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Twogood, 15 T.C. 989 (9.o), afl'd, 194 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1952); Estate of Higgs v. Comm'r, X84 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 195o).
' CODE § 2517. Gift Tax Regulations § 25.25I1-1(h)(xo) (1958) provide that an annuitants
irrevocable election of a joint and survivor annuity is a taxable gift. Adeline S. Davis v. Comm'r, 27
T.C. 378 (1956).
'Gift Tax Regulations § 2.5.251-2(c)(I958).
'See note 26 supra.
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able only to top management, whose interest in pension plans was motivated largely
by the desire to escape high surtax brackets.
(a) Coverage. Coverage of the plan must include a broad segment of the group
of persons employed by a particular business enterprise. The general policy seems
to have been to insure participation by a significant plurality of the entire group.
The Internal Revenue Code specifically defines this requirement in terms which
prohibit discrimination in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisory employees or
other highly compensated persons. Three alternative methods of satisfying this
requirement are established in the Code.30 First, if seventy per cent of all employees
(excluding part-time and seasonal employees and those employed less than five
years) actually participate in and are benefited by the plan, the requirement is
satisfied. Second, if seventy per cent of employees (as defined above) are eligible to
benefit, only eighty per cent of these need actually participate in order for the plan
to qualify. For illustration, suppose a corporation which employs i,ooo persons.
Fifty of these are seasonal employees and fifty are part-time employees. One
hundred have been employed less than five years. These are excluded altogether
for the purpose of the above rules. Under the first alternative, if 560 employees,
i.e., seventy per cent of 8oo, participate in the plan, it will qualify. The second
alternative would require fewer participants. If 56o are eligible, the actual par-
ticipation of 448 employees (eighty per cent of 56o) would be sufficient to qualify
the plan. The less than completely rigorous operation of these rules is illustrated
by the fact that in the hypothetical case, less than one-half of the employees par-
ticipate in the qualified plan. The third alternative is an employer-established
classification found by the Internal Revenue Service not to discriminate in favor
of officers, shareholders, supervisory employees, or other highly compensated
persons. The Code establishes that (I) exclusion of employees receiving only wages
of not more than $4800 per year (the present maximum amount of wages subject to
Social Security tax), and limitation of a plan to (2) salaried or (3) clerical em-
ployees will not be deemed discriminatory.3' Perhaps the Service would disapprove
a plan limited to salaried employees where only stockholder-officers were in the
salaried class. 2 However, the Code language appears mandatory and the Treasury
Department has indicated concern about possible abuse in this area.
33
(b) Benefits. The method of determining the amount of benefits and employer
contributions must not discriminate in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisory
employees, or other highly compensated persons.34 Not only must participation be
dispersed among a large segment of the employees, but the substance of this re-
quirement cannot be defeated in the computation of benefits and contributions.
'°CODE § 401(a)(3).
"CODE § 401(a)(5).
'LEON L. RICF, JR. & E. H. ScmrAuDT, BASIc PENsioN AND PROFrr-SHARING PLANS 12 (z957).
3Statement of Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, before the Senate Finance
Committee on H.R. io, CCH x961 STAND. FED,. TAx REP. § 6472.
" CoDE § 401(a) (4)-
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Contributions or benefits which bear a "uniform relationship" to compensation, such
as a flat percentage rate applied to all employees (which might be varied according
to years of service), 5 are not discriminatory even though total benefits and contri-
butions will be much larger for highly paid persons. Furthermore, the law permits
larger benefits and contributions with respect to wages and salaries in excess of
$48oo (the maximum amount of "wages" subject to Social Security tax). The
Service requires, however, that the plan shall be "integrated with Social Security"--
meaning that the benefits received with respect to earnings above the Social Security
ceiling shall not be proportionately greater than Social Security benefits8
(c) Irretrievability of Employer Contributions. A corollary of the employer
deduction for contributions to the plan is that such amounts shall be irretrievably
committed to the sole benefit of the employees under the plan, with no chance of
reversion to the employer8 7 This requirement is related to but distinct from so-
called "vesting" of the individual employee's rights in the fund. Vesting would
prevent the remaining employees from benefiting by the forfeiture which results
when a potential beneficiary leaves a particular employer. Present law does not
require vesting of an individual employee's rights,8 and if there is rapid labor
turnover, a non-vested plan may give most of its benefits to the more stable em-
ployees including officers, shareholders, supervisory employees, and other highly
compensated persons 9
(3) Nonqualified Deferred Compensation.
Nonqualified deferred compensation includes any arrangement for deferral of
realization which does not meet the statutory requirements of section 401, outlined
immediately above. The status of such arrangements involves a degree of un-
certainty since the Code does not provide an integrated method for their treatment.
A few matters are clarified by specific statutes; most must be inferred from general
statutory provisions containing broad concepts, and from the "common law" of
taxation. To the extent determinable, the present status of nonqualified arrange-
ments will be compared directly with the treatment of qualified plans.
(a) Employee Deferral. A carefully drawn plan can give reasonable assurance
that the benefits will not be taxable to the employee at the time of the contract, but
will be includible only when actually realized in cash, usually in retirement years.40
'CODE 5 401(a)(5); Rica & ScHLAuDT, op. cit. supra note 32, at 13.
Ibid.
'CODE § 401(a)(2).
'Vesting is required of profit sharing plans, but not of pension plans. RIcE & SCHLAUOT, op. cir.
supra note 32 at 14. Forfeiture and shifting would directly benefit other employees under a profit
sharing plan. Under a pension plan, forfeiture merely reduces the employer's cost, thus making
possible greater benefits and indirectly benefiting the steady employees.
Ryan School Retirement Trust v. Comm'r, 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
"Rev. Rul. 6o-35, Ig6o-i Cum. BULL. 512. Appert, Contingencies in Deferred Compensation
A4greements May Still Be a Wise Precaution, 13 J. TAXATiON x2 (g6o); Axelrad, Deferred Compensa-
tion Arrangements and Constructive Receipt of Income: Rev. Rul. 6o-3), 35 Los ANGELEs BAR BULL.
149 (x96o); Gordon, New Look of Deferred Compensation Contracts, io TUL. TAX INsT. 593 (i96x);
Note, 13 J. TAxArboN iSo (196o); Note, 43 MAnQ. L. Rav. 389 (ig6o); Note, Fair Marlet Value of
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The nonqualified arrangement, albeit with a little less certainty, shares this ad-
vantage and all resulting subsidiary advantages detailed above (except capital gain
treatment of lump sum distribution), with the qualified plan. Since a nonqualified
plan is normally non-contributory, all amounts received will be treated as income
in retirement years.
(b) Employer Deduction. Amounts paid as pension or deferred compensation
to a retired employee are deductible by the employer only in the year of actual
payment. 1 The attractive combination of employee deferment and current em-
ployer deduction is withheld from the nonqualified arrangement. If a nonquali-
fled plan is funded, and the individual employee's rights are vested, employer con-
tributions will be taxable to the employee in the year made, and deferral is sacri-
ficed. However, the employer is permitted, consistently with inclusion by the
employee, to deduct contributions in the year made. If the plan is funded and the
individual employee's rights are forfeitable (for example, upon leaving this par-
ticular employment), then the Code inflicts a harsh punishment indeed. Not only
is current deductibility denied, but even when the amounts are paid to the em-
ployee, they are still not deductible by the employer. In other words, contributions
to a funded-non-vested nonqualified plan are not deductible by the employer at
any time 2
(c) Accumulation on Fund. Tax-free accumulation on the fund is a key ad-
vantage of qualified plans not available to others. As indicated above, any kind
of funding of a nonqualified plan is discouraged by present law. There is no pro-
vision in present law for the exemption of nonqualified employee trusts, as there is
for qualified employee trusts under section 5oi(c) (17). Of course, an employer
could set aside investment funds in tax exempt securities,43 provided these were
not irretrievably committed to the benefit of employees or of a particular em-
ployee! 4  However, the income from such investments would be non-taxable re-
gardless of the purpose for which they were acquired and regardless of by whom
they were purchased. The tax-free accumulation of increment on investments which
would normally be taxable is uniquely extended to the qualified plan. Recent dis-
cussion has focused upon the possibility of accruing "interest" in favor of an em-
ployee with respect to promised deferred compensation-the interest to be added
Deferred Payment Contract Held Includible in Gross Income of Cash Basis Taxpayer in Year of Execu-
tion of Contract (Frank Cowden, 32 T.C. No. 73), 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1237 (1959); Note, 1960
DuKE L.J. 436; Rice, New Tax Policy on Deferred Compensation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 381 (196r);
Weingarten, Internal Revenue Service Relaxes Rules on Deferred Compensation, IO SAN FRANcIsco
BRIEF CASE 13 (i96o); Wood, Contingencies May Still be a Good idea in Deferred Compensation
Contracts, 12 J. TAXATION 21O (ig6o).
"CODE § 404(a)(5).
"Income Tax Regs. § I.4o4(a)-12. Cf. Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct.
Cl. 1959); Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 1249 0959).
'CODE § 103.
"See note 42 supra. As to the immunity of the employee from immediate taxation, see Casale v.
Comm'r, 247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957); Prunier v. Comm'r, 248 F.2d 8W8 (1st Cir. 1957); Sanders v.
Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (xoth Cir. x9"58).
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to the principal sum and paid upon retirement." One of the examples used by
the Internal Revenue Service in its recent Revenue Ruling 6o-3i encourages such
an arrangement.46 Perhaps this device achieves for the employee an advantage
analogous to that available under the qualified plan.
(d) Estate Tax. No special estate tax advantages exist with respect to non-
qualified arrangements. Under the 1954 Code, any death benefits payable to an
annuitant's survivor are includible in the annuitant's gross estate.4 This applies not
only to purchased annuities but also to annuities the consideration for which was
furnished by an employer under a nonqualified plan. Where an employee dying
before or after retirement has a contractual right to receive certain payments or
to have them paid to his estate or beneficiaries, the value of such rights is includible
in his gross estate." Since death has eliminated the contingency that the employee
might change employers or might compete with the employer, it has been held that
the valuation of contractual rights for estate tax purposes will not be discounted for
these now unreal contingencies.49 When the payments are received by the estate
or beneficiaries, they will be treated as income in the hands of recipient." As "in-
come in respect of a decedent," they will be offset by the portion of the estate tax
attributable to them."- The only nonqualified item which is immune to the estate
tax is a non-contractual death benefit which the employer is not legally obligated to
provide 2 Even in such cases, where the employee has a "right" to designate the re-
cipient under an established plan, the Internal Revenue Service will press for in-
clusion in the gross estate.53 Some rights to designate beneficiaries might consti-
tute powers of appointment and, if "general," would bring the amounts into the
gross estate of the holder 4'
(e) Gift Tax. There is no special exclusion from gift tax for transactions in-
volving nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements. However, as explained
above with respect to qualified plans, it is unlikely that designation of a beneficiary
would result in gift tax liabilityY5
Nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements offer few of the advantages
conferred upon qualified plans. While deferral may be available, current employer
deduction is not. If current employer deduction is achieved, deferral is not. Tax.
'
1 Appert, supra note 4 o , at 13.
'OSee note 40 supra. The favorable example involved crediting to the employce's account his share
of the net profits from investing the amount in the account. One unfavorable example involved the
payment of interest and one favorable example eschewed such payment. The Ruling is inconclusive,
but Appert argues for favorable treatment of a deferred interest arrangement.
'
T CODE S 2039.
"Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957). See also case cited supra note 25.
"Goodman v. Granger, supra note 48.
'CoDE S 69i(a).
'Id. S 69x(c).
'See note 26 supra.
"3G.C.M. 27,242, 1952-1 CuM. BuLL. 16o.
"'-CODE § 2041.
'Election of a joint and survivor annuity is the circumstance most likely to invoke gift tax. See
note 27 supra.
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free accumulation on the fund is not available. Full estate tax includibility may be
expected, and no special exemption from gift tax is extended. The balance of con-
venience strongly favors qualified plans, consistently with the intent of present law.
Why, it may be asked, are nonqualified arrangements ever employed by an in-
formed taxpayer's counsel?
The answer may be found in two major considerations. First, the nonqualified,
arrangement may be employed for the benefit of selected individuals who can com-
mand it (even supplementing benefits under a qualified plan) or for the entire
class of high-salaried top management personnel. There are no explicit limita-
tions to the discrimination in availability and benefits which may be practiced under
these arrangements. 58 Secondly, nonqualified plans are preferred because they repre-
sent a more limited commitment. If an executive agrees that instead of $50,000
per year cash salary he will receive $30,o0o currently and the remaining $20,ooo
spread over the years from age 65 to age 75, the employer has undertaken no more
financial commitment than the current payment of the cash salary in question. In-
deed, there is an economic advantage in favor of the employer since he has the use
of the $20,ooo in the interim. The initiation of a qualified pension plan involves
a major financial undertaking by the employer, the obligation of which may ex-
tend far down the avenue of the future. Frequently, the bulk of employees expect
that the plan will be entirely supplementary to their regular cash wages, and do
not view a retirement provision as the equivalent of a cash wage. (Since many
plans are not vested this tendency may be well founded on the part of the more
mobile workers).
Added impetus to the employment of nonqualified devices was furnished by the
Internal Revenue Service in i96o. Its long-awaited Revenue Ruling 6o-3I" clarified
a number of theretofore uncertain questions. Prior to i96o, counsel drafting non-
qualified arrangements were concerned that the doctrine of "constructive receipt"
or the related "economic benefit" concept might be applied to hold that a con-
tractual right to receive future payment is income to the employee at the time
the services are rendered and the contract is made. In a workmanlike endeavor to
ward off this danger, they drew such contracts so as to make ultimate receipt con-
tingent on a number of events which would be resolved only at some remote future
time. Specifically, it was common to make ultimate payment contingent upon the
employee's remaining in the employ of the particular business enterprise. This
contingency in the "work out" period was thought effective to prevent inclusion
during the duration of the employment period. One writer suggested that the
attainment of retirement age would eliminate this contingency, and might cause all
retirement income to be accrued in the year of retirement.58 In order to avoid this
& 'Ofcourse, the aggregate compensation, cash and deferred, must be reasonable. ConE § I62(a)(i),
Income Tax Regs. § 1.162-7 (i958). This requirement limits qualified as well as nonqualified ar-
rangements. RIcE & Sc.LAuDt, op. ct. supra note 32, at i6.-
'T See note 40 supra.
'Eisenstein, A Care of Deferred Compensation, 4 TAx L. REv. 391 (1949).
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possibility, further contingencies for the "pay out" period were commonly em-
ployed. Most frequent was the requirement that, after retirement, the employee
not compete with his former employer. The agreement would provide that if
he did compete, he would thereby forfeit his right to future payments. Finally,
continued receipt of the payments was made contingent upon the rendition of con-
suiting services when requested by the former employer. (If consulting services
are to be given only upon demand, they may reduce or eliminate Social Security
benefits only for a particular month)?.
The most significant change introduced by the new Revenue Ruling is to make
it clear that contingencies such as those enumerated above, whether real or fictitious
in the actual fact situation, were in any event unnecessary to secure the advantage of
deferral. Several cautious commentators, remembering former reversals of Treas-
ury views, would retain the full panoply of appropriate contingencies in contracts
drawn for their clients.60 Perhaps also many employers will wish to continue the
practice of tying the employee to them with a silver cord of contingent deferred
compensation. Surely no astute employee would accept, as a substitute for cash of
an equal amount, deferred compensation whose ultimate receipt depended on his
own immobility. But where such agreements are used more to season the pot of
total job advantages, such contingencies will still be employed for a business or
commercial reason. Where the contingencies were unreal in the factual situation
presented, nothing would be gained by elimination of these contingencies in future
contracts. But in that middle ground where the contingencies would have real
meaning and the employee is bargaining for deferred compensation to sweeten his
tax position, it seems likely that contingencies will recede in importance and tend to
disappear in practice.
The second major point clarified by Revenue Ruling 6o-3i relates to funding.
As mentioned above, funding jeopardizes either deferral or employer deductibility,
depending upon whether the individual employee's rights are vested.0 ' The new
Revenue Ruling 6o-3i lends further emphasis to the undesirability of funding a
nonqualified plan, if further emphasis were needed. Clear warning is extended
that placing the funds in trust or in escrow to assure ultimate payment to the em-
ployee will bring about immediate inclusion in the employee's income. This is
not to say that an employer cannot, in a different sense, "fund" his anticipated obli-
gation. So long as the funds set aside to meet the liability under the deferred
compensation arrangement remain the property of the employer and would be
available to satisfy creditors' claims against the employer, the advantage of deferral
is not in jeopardy.
0 74 Stat. 936 (ig6o), 42 U.S.C, S 4 o3 (b), 4 o3 (f)(i)(D) and 4 03(f)( 4 ) (Supp. II x961). Con-
sulting services may prevent termination of employment and hence jeopardize capital 'gain treatment
for lump-sum distributions from qualified plans. See note 20 supra.
eo See Appert, supra note 40; Wood, supra note 40.
- See note 42 supra and related text.
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(4) The Plight of the Self-Employed: HR. io
Since i95i, a rising crescendo of complaint has emanated from the self-em-
ployed.!2 Most vocal has been the professional man, whose earnings may place him
in -a relatively high bracket but who must provide for retirement out of after-tax
earnings. He eyes covetously his corporate executive neighbor of similar income
who looks forward to relative financial security for old age under a qualified plan.
At least for the self-employed who do intend to retire, a real inequity exists, although
it affects those employed by a proprietorship or partnership as well as the proprietors
themselves. The effect upon these employees is indirect but nonetheless real. Since
their employers cannot themselves qualify as "employees" and gain the benefits of
a qualified plan, the incentive which has served so well to stimulate the growth of
qualified plans is lacking. Perhaps the most natural response in the face of envy is to
seek for oneself the coveted advantage. And this is the wellworn but as yet un-
successful path trodden by the self-employed since 195i. The perennial H.R. io
offers tax reform the American way: "Give the same loophole to everyone." (If
this goal were truly attained, it would result in a highly equitable and perhaps
psychologically more acceptable tax system.)
Immediately before adjournment in September i961, Congress came near to
passing H.R. io. The bill had been approved by the House of Representatives, and
had been reported favorably to the Senate by the Committee on Finance. The es-
sence of the bill is the allowance of a deduction for amounts of self-employment
income set aside irretrievably to provide for future retirement. The annual de-
duction would be limited to ten per cent of earned income (excluding return on
capital investment in the business), subject to a maximum ceiling of $i75o per year.
The entire amount set aside up to $iooo, but only one-half of the excess, would be
deductible, up to a maximum of $25o0 (for earned income of $25,00o or more).
Thus, if earned income equaled $25,ooo, ten per cent or $25oo could be set aside
for retirement. The first $iooo plus $75o (one-half of the added $i5oo) would be
deductible.
A number of objections to the bill as approved by the House were overcome by
amendments made in the Senate Finance Committee; others were not.
(a) The House bill required the self-employed to include their employees in a
plan only if there were four or more employees. This was attacked as discrimina-
tory against the persons employed in a group of less than four employees. It was
'Donohue, Smathers-Keogh-Simpson Legislation: Retirement Savings for the Self-Employed, 45
A.B.A.J. 795 (1959); Jones & Boehm, Keogh Review: Highlights of the Efforts to Secure Tax Relief
for Retirement Savings of the Self-Employed, 14 J. Am. Soc'y C.L.U. i1 (196o); Keogh, Pensions
for the Self-Employed: Passage of New H.R. zo is Indicated, Ioo TRusTs & EsTATEs 175 (i961);
Keogh, Tax Equity for Self-Employed, 47 A.B.A.J. 655 (i96i); Lauritzen, Self-Employed Taxpayer-
Second Class Citizen, 4 TAx COUNSELOR'S Q. i (i96o); Polisher, Self-Employed Individuals' Retirement
Bill of 5959, 1959 INs. L.J. 309, 37 TAXES 321 (1959); Rapp, The Jenkins-Keogh Bill-An Explanation,
24 J. BAR ASS'N KAN. 240 (956); 27 N.Y.STA'r BAR BULL. 424 (955): Silverson, Taxation and the
Self-Employed-A Study of Retrogression, 4 A.B.A.J. 50 (1955); Trigg, The Jenkins-Keogh Bills-What
They Mean to the Lawyer, 24 DETROIT LAw. 3 (956); Vernon & Molloy, Retirement Benefits for the
Self-Employed, x2 F.R.D. 417 (1952).
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also characterized as unduly favoring this class of employer as compared with cor-
porate employers of less than four. The Senate bill requires coverage of the em-
ployees of self-employed persons without regard to their number.
(b) Contributions for the employees of self-employed persons would neces-
sarily be based on earned income. The House bill permitted the self-employed to
take deductions based on "self-employment income" which would sometimes in-
clude a return in the nature of interest on capital invested in the business. Thus,
contributions for the self-employed would be computed on a more favorable basis
than contributions for their employees. The Senate bill bases all contributions on
earned income only, which is defined as thirty per cent of the self-employment in-
come where capital is employed in the business.
(c) Neither bill extended capital gain treatment to lump-sum distributions,
thereby failing to achieve tax equity between corporate employees and the self-
employed. While the House bill would have treated such sums as ordinary income
in the year of receipt, the Senate bill relieves bunching to a limited extent. The
amount received is subjected to a tax equal to five times the amount which would
result from including one-fifth of the lump-sum in income in the year of receipt.
This is similar to a spreadback, but measures the bracket level by the year of re-
ceipt rather than the average income of the five year span.
(d) Both bills required that the employee's rights (as well as those of the self-
employed) should vest at an early point. Since early vesting is not required of
qualified pension plans (although it is of profit sharing plans), this may be cited
as a discrimination in favor of the self-employed and their employees as against
corporate employees.
(e) Since there is no dollar limitation on the amount of contribution which may
be made under a qualified plan, tax equity is not achieved by H.R. Io which per-
mits the deduction of the lesser of ten per cent of earned income or $175o.
The first two objections to H.R. io have been cured by the Senate amendments.
The third objection calls in question the appropriateness of capital gains treatment
under qualified plans, not the validity of the Senate's proposed averaging approach.
If equality is to be achieved with respect to lump-sum distributions, it might better
be sought on a basis more justifiable than the capital gains approach. If the vest-
ing requirements of the Senate bill discriminate in favor of the self-employed and
their employees, the remedy might be to extend the early vesting requirement
to qualified plans, not to withhold it from the new proposal. Finally, while H.R.
io does not bring about equality of treatment between the self-employed and cor-
porate employees, the remaining inequities seem relatively minor and not a sound
basis for opposition to the bill. What is important is that H.R. io would reduce
the inequality of present law. An overall evaluation of H.R. io as amended will
show that it is a salutary step in the direction of tax equity. Present budgetary
demands may permit no more than this. In two respects, the bill points the way
toward future improvement of the entire tax treatment of retirement provision.
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(5) Self-Help for the Self-Employed
After ten years of unsuccessful legislative activity, the professional class of
self-employed persons has undertaken, with the cooperation of seventeen state legis-
latures, to help itself to a qualified plan. The key difficulty has been that neither
a sole proprietor nor a partner is an "employee" for purposes of the tax law. This
fact has rendered unattainable not only qualified pension and profit sharing plans,
but also a small host of less significant but nonetheless substantial tax advantages,
especially:
i. Employee death benefits. Section ioi(b). By analogy to the exclusion of life
insurance, the Code assures nontaxability for $5,ooo paid to an employee's
survivors.
2. Deductible premium on group term life insurance."
3. Sick pay exclusion. Section io5(d).
4. Exempt lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer. Section xi9.
5. Medical expense. Section io5(b). The medical expenses of an employee, his
spouse, and his dependents paid by a corporate employer are deductible by the
corporation and are yet not income to the employee.
6.Employee stock options. Section 421. Promising executive talent could be
given an opportunity to purchase a proprietary interest in te employer cor-
poration at a price which is advantageous when the option is exercised, with-
out the employee being taxed on the bargain purchase.
Montana's most notable tourist attraction to itinerant professional men would
probably be Dr. Kintner's medical clinic in Missoula, which in 1954 was held to
constitute a corporation for purposes of the federal income tax, whose member-
practitioners were "employees" of the entity. The Ninth Circuit upheld deduction
of contributions to a qualified pension plan. 5
At first, the Internal Revenue Service was reluctant to approve this result be-
cause of its understandable hesitancy to "open the flood gates." Besides, H.R. xo
was being considered throughout the last ten years, and its possible enactment would
relieve some of the pressure on the "professional association" route to tax equity.
Another federal court, apparently not cognizant of the Ksintner case, reached the
'Eber, The Pros and Cons of the New Professional Service Corporations, 15 J. TAxArOlN 308 (1961);
Jones, The Professional Corporation, 27 FovansLz L. REv. 353 (x958); Lyon, Action in Indiana on
Kintner-Type Organizations, 39 TAxEs 266 ( 961); Maier, Don't Confuse Kintner-Type Associations
with New Professional Corporations, 15 J. TAXATION 248 (196i); Ray, Corporate Tax Treatment of
Medical Clinics Organized as Associations, 39 TAxEs 73 (196i); Stutsman, How to Organize Professional
Men for Corporate Tax Status Under Kintner, ii J. TA.XAIoN¢ 336 (959); Wolfman & Price, Qualifying
Under Final Kintner Rules Will Be Difficult in Most States, 14 J. TAXATION 105 (1961). Bittker,
Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAX L. REV.
i (1961), abstracted in z6 J. TAXATIONI 238 (1962); Kahn, The Wisconsin Service Corporation Law of
z96!, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 65; Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HAMy. L. REV. 776
(1962); Plate, Professional Associations in Ohio, 31 U. CINC. L. REV. 71 (1962).
"Income Tax Regulations § i.61-2(d)(2) (1957). See Rev. Rul. 54-i65, 1954-1 Cumr. BULL. 17.
'United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9 th Cir. 1954).
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same result under Texas law. 6° Then six years after the Kintner case, the "Kintner
Regulations" 7  were promulgated in final form. Under these regulations, the
Treasury applies six criteria to determine whether an organization "more nearly
resembles" a corporation than a partnership or trust:
i. Associates,
2. An objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom,
3- Continuity of life,
4- Centralization of management,
5.Limitation of liability for corporate debts to corporate property,
6. Free transferability of interests.
State law determines whether these characteristics inhere in a particular organiza-
tion. The regulations indicate that since (i) associates and (2) a business pur-
pose are common to partnerships and corporations, they are indispensable require-
ments for corporate status. Apparently a preponderance of the remaining four
characteristics-i.e., more than two-will carry the day the corporate way.
In those states which have enacted either the Uniform Partnership Act or the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, it may be difficult to attain corporate status.
In Ohio and perhaps some other states the "Limited Partnership Association Act"
may provide the required corporate attributesP s By the end of March 1962,
seventeen states had enacted legislation authorizing the formation of what may be
called "professional associations" or "professional corporations," which are designed
to thwart legal (and perhaps ethical) obstacles and concurrently satisfy the Kintner
regulations.6
Many unresolved problems stand between the eager professional man and his
qualified plan even in these seventeen states. Some problems are common to sev-
eral states, such as the one-man "association." Contradictory as the phrase appears,
the Ohio Act specifically authorizes such organizations, 7 ' and precedent is not
Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (D. Tex. 1959).
'Treas. Regs. § 301.7701-1 and -2 (ig6o), promulgated as T.D. 6503, Nov. 13, i96o, 25 Fed.
Reg. 10928 (ig6o).
'eOko REv. CODE § 1783.01 et seq. (1961 Supp.)
"CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REt,. contains the text of all the following laws, at the paragraph
numbers indicated in parentheses:
Alabama, H. 138, Act No. 865 (para. 6526)
Arkansas, Act. 79, 471 (paras. 6421, 6422)
Connecticut, § 44, Uniform Partnership Law (para. 6444)
Florida, H.B. 2161 (para. 6423) Oklahoma, S.B. No. 399 (para. 6476)
Georgia, Act 285 (para. 6424) Pennsylvania, S.B. 525 (para. 6492)
Illinois, S.B. 804 (para. 6496) South Dakota, H.B. 689 (para. 6426)
Minnesota, S.F. No. 42X (para. 6425) Tennessee, ch. 181 (para. 6427)
Ohio, S.B. 550 (para. 6459) Wisconsin, ch. 350 (para. 6498)
See also a recent amendment to the Texas Uniform Partnership Law, CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAx
REP. para. 6578.
In March, 1962, four more states enacted laws. See CCH 1962 STAND. FED. TAX REP. They are
the following:
Arizona, S.B. No. 185 (para. 6353) South Carolina, H. 2154 (para. 6354)
Kentucky, H.B. No. 97 (para. 6355) Virginia, ch. 277, H. 395 (para. 6345)
75 Osno Rav. CODE § 1785.02 (x961 Supp.).
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entirely lacking--consider the familiar close-held corporation all of whose stock is
owned by a single individual. Particular local problems may arise under the variant
wording of these state laws. For example, does the Ohio statute create a "cor-
poration" for all purposes of the Ohio law? The Act denominates the organization
an "association," but uses the word corporation or incorporation in six places.
Cross reference is made to the General Corporation Code, and it is provided that
all provisions of Ohio corporate law, except those specifically rendered inoperative
by the Professional Association Act itself, apply fully to these organizations. It
has been urged that if the state law creates a "corporation" in the ordinary sense,
then its treatment for federal tax purposes follows automatically, and compliance
with the Kintner regulations is unnecessary.71 In this writer's opinion, the mere
labeling for state law would not control for federal tax purposes. However, if the
substantive rules of state corporation law with all resulting characteristics apply to
an organization, more than semantics is involved. This may be the true effect
of the Ohio statute.72 Thus we are brought back to a careful inventory of corporate
characteristics, taking into account the entire law of the state, and not merely the
Professional Association Act itself. Some characteristics not mentioned in the
Kintner regulations may be important to the ultimate characterization.
Perhaps the pendency of H.R. io and quite probably the Administration's current
study of long range tax reform, have contributed to the Commissioner's continued
reluctance to embrace the new creature in the legal entity menagerie. District
Directors have been denied authority to rule favorably on Kintner Klinics and must
either deny approval or forward the request to the National Office for initial and
final decision.7 It is apparent that particular scrutiny will be given to the reality
and bona fides of the putative employment relationship, a question which is related
to but distinct from the viability of the entity.74
The situation today is reminiscent of early 1948 when at least seven common
law states had adopted or were about to adopt the Community Property System,
entirely unsuited to their tradition and experience, solely to attain the benefits of
income splitting.75 Just as President Truman vetoed the marital deduction and
income splitting proposal in 1948, speculation has envisaged similar action by Presi-
dent Kennedy if Congress should pass H.R. io. If the parallel is sound, history
71Maier, supra note 63. But see Bittker, supra note 63.
"aConsider Bulletin No. 161 from the Ohio Tax Commissioner to All County Auditors, Aug. 15,
1961. 22 CCH STATE TAX REv. No. 39 (Sept. 25, g6i): associations are corporations for all state
tax purposes. In State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, i8o N.E.2d 157 (1962), mandamus
was sought to compel the Secretary of State to accept articles of incorporation of professional association of
lawyers. Held, writ denied. The court stated that Rule XIV of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice pre-
vents "the formation of a corporation to engage in the practice of law .. " On the other hand, consider
OHIO CoNsr. art. XIII, § 3, which precludes modification of the usual limited liability of corporate
shareholders. Hence the professional association must be presumed to be other than a corporation in
order to preserve its constitutionality. See Brock, Taxes-Professional Associations-Not Permissible
for Lawyers Under Present Ohio Court Rules, 31 U. CINC. L. REv. - (1962).
7 Rev. Pro. 61-i, I.R.B. 1961-18, p. 53 (May x, i96i).
'ibid.
BORIS I. BirTrxm, FEDERAL INcoME, ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 280 n.2 (958).
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suggests the possibility that the veto would be overridden as in X948. A factor
of great importance is the Administration's current study of long range tax reform,
which will comprehend the demand for tax equity on the part of the self-employed
from a perspective which can survey the overall problem of the taxation of retire-
ment provision.
II
A PRoPosED TAX TREATMENT FOR RETIREMENT PRoVISION
There are strong indications that the taxation of retirement provision will re-
ceive thorough study and may undergo radical surgery as a result of the Treasury
Department's current study of long range tax reform. There is prospect of a more
integrated approach than has heretofore been taken. The question is always open
academically, and may before long become open politically: How should retirement
provision be taxed?
A significant contribution to the discussion of this question is contained in the
work of Macaulay.76 He proposes a new three-fold classification of retirement ar-
rangements:
I. Vested refundable. The retirement income is assured whether the employee
remains with the particular employer or not (vested). Furthermore, if the
employee should die before retirement, his estate or named beneficiaries will
be entitled to receive a death benefit equal to the contributions made by the
employee and by his employer on his behalf. An employee might also be en-
tided to receive all contributions upon termination of his employment.
2. Vested non-refundable. The employee will receive benefits only if he lives
to retirement age (non-refundable). However, the rights to retirement in-
come do not depend on remaining with the particular employer (vested).
3. Non-vested. Not only must the employee live until retirement in order to
receive any benefits, but also he must remain with the particular employer.
Macaulay then proposes the following tax treatment:
(i) Vested Refundable. Equating such a plan to a savings account with restric-
tions on withdrawal, he would make employer contributions taxable to the employee
when made. Earnings on the portion of the fund attributable to each employee
would be currently taxable as well. Benefits when received would be taxable under
the annuity rule, with an exclusion ratio based on amounts previously taxed.
(2) Vested Non-refundable. Considering the contributions to such a plan as
premiums for pure income insurance, the employer's portion should be excludable
from the employee's income, and the employee's contributions should be deductible.
Benefits would be taxable when received, with no investment recovery exclusion.
(3) Non-vested. Because receipt of retirement benefits is contingent upon re-
maining with the particular employer, as well as upon living to retirement age,
HUGH H. MACAULAY, FRINGE BENEFITS AND THEIR FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT ch. IV (x959).
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this sort of plan is too contingent to be characterized as pure income insurance. It
constitutes some other kind of aleatory contract, bordering on a gambling arrange-
ment. Since non-vested plans reduce the mobility of labor, they should be dis-
couraged through disfavor under the tax law. (The favorable treatment proposed
for vested non-refundable plans will encourage their adoption instead.) Therefore,
the employer's contributions should be taxable to the employee at the time made.
The earnings on the fund allocable to the particular employee should be currently
taxed. Benefits would be taxable under the annuity rule when received, an exclusion
ratio being allowed for contributions previously subjected to tax.
Macaulay makes no suggestion with reference to the tax treatment of the employer
under any of the three types of plan.
This writer suggests a further distinction between the character of the annuity
rights after retirement has been reached, and the nature of the employee's rights
before retirement age. After retirement the plan may give (alternately to lump-sum
distribution) (i) a straight single life annuity whose payments will cease upon the
death of the annuitant however early this may occur, (2) a refundable annuity pro-
viding a minimum number of payments certain equal to the investment, or (3)
an annuity providing a number of payments certain, still less than total investment.
There may be a joint and survivor annuity, with any of the three arrangements as
to payments after death of both annuitants. Furthermore, the plan might offer
an "annuity" without life contingencies, such as a simple installment payment over
ten or twenty years equaling the total contributions plus some agreed rate of interest.
Finally, non-qualified deferred compensation contracts frequently provide con-
tingent rights even during the pay-out period which would be forfeited if, for ex-
ample, the former employee were to compete with his former employer. Any
one of Macaulay's three types of plans, even including the non-vested type, might
provide a refundable annuity once retirement age has been reached. While the
nature of the employee's rights after retirement may determine appropriate tax treat-
ment at that time, it should not necessarily control tax treatment during the working
years.
Macaulay's classification and discussion seem to be directed mainly to the em-
ployee's rights during the working period. His elaborate analysis distinguishing the
refundable savings type plan from other vested plans is a real contribution. How-
ever, it seems that defined operationally, a plan is "refundable" or not depending
upon whether there are death benefits during the working period. A vested non-
refundable plan providing death benefits in any amount becomes pro tanto a vested
refundable plan. If death benefits equal total contributions, then the plan is wholly
refundable.
Is it not the case that we are dealing with two kinds of income insurance-re-
tirement insurance (non-refundable plans) and life insurance (refundable plans)?
Where death benefits amount to less than or more than total contributions, risk-spread-
ing, the hallmark of life insurance, is more apparent. But even where death pay-
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ments are exactly equal to contributions, this portion of the aggregate of rights under
the contract may be only a special form of increasing term life insurance. Many
economists, perhaps representing the weight of professional opinion, hold that life
insurance premiums, excepting that part which represents savings but including
the administrative cost of spreading the risk, should be deductible as a cost of
maintaining taxable income. 7 Present law, of course, normally excludes from in-
come the total amount of life insurance proceeds7s and precludes deduction of
premiums, 9 just the opposite of the income insurance approach of economists. If
the portion of insurance premiums which represents the pure cost of income in-
surance plus the portion representing administrative expense were to become de-
ductible, this would call for taxation of life insurance proceeds when received.
Retirement plans, like other forms of "property," represent a bundle of rights.
Even the non-vested plan, shifting contributions and benefits from the less stable
or more mobile worker to those who remain with the employer throughout their
working lives, provides a kind of "term" retirement income insurance. A vested
non-refundable plan simply offers a permanent policy of retirement insurance, not
permitting forfeiture and consequent transfer of one's interest in the fund to another
on termination of employment. Vested refundable plans, and any plans which in-
clude death benefits, combine retirement insurance with a certain amount of life
insurance.
It is submitted that all three forms of retirement provision, with the possible
exception of those which permit withdrawal of all contributions on termination
of employment, are forms of income insurance-partly against the risk of retirement
and partly against the risk of death-and hence should be deductible by the employee
if made from cash income and excludable if made by an employer on an employee's
behalf.
Corollary is the full taxability of all retirement benefits when received, and in-
clusion of life insurance proceeds in gross income as well. Since these forms of
income insurance are also socially approved forms of income shifting, tax should be
imposed on those who receive, not those who provide, the income. Shift the
tax with the enjoyment Provision could be made for the tax-free recovery of the
non-deductible portion of life insurance premiums. The hardship of bunching
could be relieved by permitting annuity elections that would postpone inclusion,
or by a spreadback or averaging deviceY0 The proposal has the advantage that the
income element in life insurance contracts, heretofore non-taxable, would return
to the tax base. Although immediate revenues would probably be reduced, in the
long run the tax base would be increased. While contributions to retirement plans
and life insurance premiums"' would be eliminated from the base, all benefits would
return to it in future years, compounded by the increment on the funds.
' For example, WILLIAMs S. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRSSmivE TAXATION 66 (1947).
"CODE § 101. ' Id. §§ 262, 264.
'The "5 times the tax on x/5 the income" rule of H.R. io has much to recommend it.
'The savings portion of life insurance premium-approximately the difference between ordinary life
and term-would be nondeductible. Basis would be the nondeductible portion of premium, and only the
excess would be taxable when proceeds were received.
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The proposed treatment of retirement provision necessarily permits unlimited
deferral. Serious revenue problems resulting from this could be controlled by
placing a dollar limitation on total contributions for all retirement arrangements,
for the self-employed or the corporate employee. Over a long term of years these
limitations could be relieved as deferred income, enhanced by its increment, returns
to the tax base in ever-increasing amounts.
The key fiscal tool for influencing employer behavior is of course control of the
employer deduction. It is assured current deductibility, more than anything else,
which renders an employer willing to incur the cost of providing retirement bene-
fits on a broad scale. Deferral for management employees provides an added in-
centive, but cannot in itself induce the large financial undertaking which adoption
of a plan entails. The salutary policy of encouraging diffusion of retirement bene-
fits among the entire working population could be furthered by continuing to
limit favorable treatment to qualified plans, although requirements for qualification
-applicable alike to self-employed and corporate employees-could be tightened up.
The trend toward vested plans could be encouraged by extending future qualifica-
tion (as does H.R. io) only to plans which provide for early vesting, thereby en-
hancing the mobility of labor.
Consistently with the proposed treatment of private retirement plans, Social Se-
curity contributions made by employers should continue non-taxable. The em-
ployee's contributions should become deductible. Any dollar limitation on total
retirement provision might take into account amounts contributed to Social Security.
Contributions to the Social Security fund made by the self-employed should be
fully deductible. All benefits would be taxable when received. No great hardship
on low income persons would result since exemptions are doubled after age 65
and the present exemption of Social Security is in many cases an unnecessary
duplication.
If budgetary considerations require, as they probably will, the imposition of dollar
limitations on total retirement provision, the pressure on non-qualified plans will
increase radically. It seems probable that an integrated treatment of retirement
provision must set limitations on non-qualified plans. Either tax disfavor must
eliminate them-directing all deferred compensation into the qualified category--or
at least statutory rules governing the extent of and requirements for deferral and
deduction must be evolved. This is probably unfinished business, begun by section
23(p) of the 1939 Code as enacted in 194z (now section 404(a)).
Of course, the practical urgency behind the drive for deferral stems from a felt
common need for relief from the high surtax brackets. The integrity of a grad-
uated tax structure would not be undermined by a provision for lifetime averaging,
whatever its administrative feasibility8 2 To a large extent, the interest in deferred
'HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCO E TAXATION 154 (1938); VxcKREy, op. cit. supra note 77,
at 172-97; Pechman, A Practical Averaging Proposal, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 261 (954); Maxwell, Averaging
Fluctuating Income of the Individual for Income Tax Purposes, 2o AcCoUNTING REv. 85 (1945); Steger,
On the Theoretical Equity of An Averaging Concept for Income Tax Purposes, 13 TAx L. REv. 211
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compensation of all types derives from the desire to achieve pro tanto the benefits of
lifetime averaging. It may be said that permitted deferral is a piece-meal approach
to the need for averaging, but until an equitable and administratively feasible
system of lifetime averaging has been evolved, there is considerable reason for re-
taining and expanding this area of permitted averaging. The advantage of the
present approach, proposed to be expanded to cover all taxpayers subject alike to
common limitations, is that it places a tax incentive behind the extremely valuable
social goal of wide scale voluntary provision for retirement. In a sense, retirement
provision is long-range saving. It is distinct from ordinary saving in the limita-
tions on withdrawal and the resulting equity in deferral. The economic impact of
the growth of pension plans is a subject of great interest and concern s8 It
cannot help but have the effect of increasing the amount of economic wealth avail-
able for investment in productive enterprise. On grounds of equity, reconcilable
with varying budgetary demands, not inconsistent with the graduated tax structure,
and in the name of economic growth, the foregoing proposal is submitted.
(1958); see also Steger, Averaging Income for Tax Purposes: A Statistical Study, 9 NAT'L TAX J. 97
(1956); Steger, Life-time Income Averaging: What It Means for the Professional, 12 Ttx L. Ray. 427
(7957).
Present tax law abounds with special limited averaging provisions, varying widely in their
approach:
(a) Net Operating Loss Carryovcr, CODE S 172; (b) Capital Loss Carryover, CODE S 1212; (c)
Compensation for a Long-Range Project, CODE § 1301; (d) Damages for Patent Infringement, CODE
§ 1304; (e) Income from an Invention or Artistic Work, CODE § 1302; (f) Back Pay, CODE § 1303;
(g) Damages for Breach of Contract, CODE § 1305; (h) Restoration of Amounts Received under a
Claim of Right, CoDE § 1341; (i) Throwback of Excess Distributions of Trust Income, CODE § 668(a);
(j) Surrender of a Life Insurance or Annuity Contract, CODE § 72(e)(3); (k) Installment Method,
CODE § 453; (1) Tax Benefit Rule, Co)DE § axI; (m) Long-Term Capital Gains Treatment in General,
CODE §9 1201, 1202; (n) Corporate accumulation at flat rate and dividend distribution timed to pro-
duce averaging; (o) similar practice with discretionary trusts.
'PAUL P. HARBRECaf, PENsiON FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER (x959). The rise of pension plans
is correlated with the problem of mandatory retirement. See RIcHmu A. & J. W. TowaR, ExECtMvE
RETI-REMENT AND EFFECIE MANAGEMENT (Ig6I).
